Wednesday, October 12, 2005
Good versus Blind Faith
Josh Marshall, in a recent Talking Points Memo, reveals the revisionist history that underlies both \tilt and Nobel sensibilities.
Marshall exposes the base assumptions undergirding the new talking points for the war:
Call it the John Kerry Gambit.
Note that this requires a complete suspension of disbelief about Saddam Hussein and his now well-documented success in bribing, manipulating, and otherwise running circles around the international community, including first and foremost Hans Blix and El Baradei.
Liberals and other anti-war, anti-administration, and anti-Bush partisans continue to maintain that there was no WMD threat posed by Saddam Hussein, that he was no major state sponsor of terror, and that UN Weapons and Atomic Energy inspectors came up empty on significant violations because there were none.
Please. Not only were there major violations, there was compelling evidence that someone in the UN was tippuing off the Iraqis about the targets of upcoming inspections. The inspection rules were also nothing more than milquetoast niceties that allowed Saddam and his ministries a big say in what and how facilities were searched, what was within and off limits.
That, and Saddam had 6 months of the Coalition walking through the process of compelling him to comply with UN Security Council resolutions, and the increasing certainty that, this time, we meant what we said. Plenty of time to whsik materials out of Iraq. There is plenty of evidence that Saddam worked in collusion with Syrian and Iranian kindred spirits. Are the people peddling this Diplomatic history of the war in Iraq that credulous that Saddam was merely bluffing? That the very real indications of his WMD intents, not to mention established capability well proven by thousands of gassed Kurds, were just idle dabbling? That Saddam sought uranium, nucelar capability, forged links with terrorist groups, supported the PLO, none of this points at anything more sinister than a day-in-the-life of Average Middle Eastern Potentate?
In an earlier post (to which he links even as he tries to recast history), Marshall still clung to the old talking points, somewhat contrary to how he started this post on the threat of force:
In good faith, we must not rely on blind faith, no matter what the UN or Nobel prize committee tell us.
Links: Basil's Blog, Cao's Blog, Indepundit, Jo's Cafe, Outside the Beltway, Mudville Gazette, Dawn Patrol at Mudville
Marshall exposes the base assumptions undergirding the new talking points for the war:
We never would have gotten inspectors back into Iraq without a credible threat of force. But once the inspectors were in, they quickly began undermining the case that there was any serious WMD program or capability in Iraq. Had we pursued the inspections process in good faith, which we would have done had our true goal been eliminating WMDs (or confirming they weren't there), we probably would have avoided this current mess because the war never would have started.To speak plainly, this thread of argument tries to portray a sensible position on the need for Congressional approval for the threat of force to get Saddam Hussein to comply with the UN weapons inspection regime. But then, we were to somehow pause with sufficient apparent intent that Hussein would yield. (He did not.)
Call it the John Kerry Gambit.
Note that this requires a complete suspension of disbelief about Saddam Hussein and his now well-documented success in bribing, manipulating, and otherwise running circles around the international community, including first and foremost Hans Blix and El Baradei.
Liberals and other anti-war, anti-administration, and anti-Bush partisans continue to maintain that there was no WMD threat posed by Saddam Hussein, that he was no major state sponsor of terror, and that UN Weapons and Atomic Energy inspectors came up empty on significant violations because there were none.
Please. Not only were there major violations, there was compelling evidence that someone in the UN was tippuing off the Iraqis about the targets of upcoming inspections. The inspection rules were also nothing more than milquetoast niceties that allowed Saddam and his ministries a big say in what and how facilities were searched, what was within and off limits.
That, and Saddam had 6 months of the Coalition walking through the process of compelling him to comply with UN Security Council resolutions, and the increasing certainty that, this time, we meant what we said. Plenty of time to whsik materials out of Iraq. There is plenty of evidence that Saddam worked in collusion with Syrian and Iranian kindred spirits. Are the people peddling this Diplomatic history of the war in Iraq that credulous that Saddam was merely bluffing? That the very real indications of his WMD intents, not to mention established capability well proven by thousands of gassed Kurds, were just idle dabbling? That Saddam sought uranium, nucelar capability, forged links with terrorist groups, supported the PLO, none of this points at anything more sinister than a day-in-the-life of Average Middle Eastern Potentate?
In an earlier post (to which he links even as he tries to recast history), Marshall still clung to the old talking points, somewhat contrary to how he started this post on the threat of force:
So we have an immensely difficult, even impossible, challenge that we embarked on -- let's be frank -- for no good reason. And you don't have to be a genius to add up the pros and cons of that one.The task we have before us is not impossible, and it won't be long now that the issue is settled quite convincingly by a free and functioning Iraqi democracy and a totally defeated and disgraced Al Qaeda in Iraq. And right up until the moment that happens (and possibly for quite a time after, there will be those who still cry out for the failure that might have been, based on the blind faith they yet cling to about the sufficiency of the UN and its peacekeeping regimes.
In good faith, we must not rely on blind faith, no matter what the UN or Nobel prize committee tell us.
Links: Basil's Blog, Cao's Blog, Indepundit, Jo's Cafe, Outside the Beltway, Mudville Gazette, Dawn Patrol at Mudville
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It would be nice if the UN were able to do what people think it can do.
On the military side, I'm with that kid several years back that refused to serve under UN authority on the basis that it constituted a foreign government.
Pesky homeschoolers. ;-)
On the military side, I'm with that kid several years back that refused to serve under UN authority on the basis that it constituted a foreign government.
Pesky homeschoolers. ;-)
I'm interested in knowing why there wasn't more revealed about the 1.8 tons of enriched uranium that we air-lifted out of al-Tuwaitha in 2004 along with the discovery of 500 tons of yellow cake and materials, numbering over 1000 radioactive items, that were retrieved from al-Tuwaitha, included Cesium-137 and Cobalt-60. (Both are extremely radioactive substances that are ideal for use in Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD), or “dirty bombs.”)
This was revealed by Doug Hanson over at Frontpage Magazine in 2004, and surely there's been a full analysis of the source of the materials that were flown to the US, and the materials that remain at Tuwaitha. I've been anxiously awaiting some media exposure--any media exposure as to this analysis, based on the "Bush lied" mantra of those who carped about the so-called fabricated intelligence about Iraq seeking uranium from Africa (Niger).
It would seem to me that regardless as to the source of the yellow cake, this was a major discovery that deserved some coverage...
That discovery was in addition to the many barrels of "pesticides" found all over Iraq, some of which was buried in ammunitions dumps, which gave people who were exposed to it the symptoms of being exposed to nerve agents.
The whole story quite simply isn't being told, but enough has been publicized that indicates that "no wmd" was debunked a long time ago--when we went into Iraq in 2003 and Dr. Obeidi turned over the components to his gas centrifuge and the plans (which could have falled into other more dangerous hands).
Couple all of that with the initiative to find meaningful work for the scientists who were working on his nuke program, and you have a pretty big and full picture of something very different than "no wmd".
God Bless you and your family, dadmanly.
This was revealed by Doug Hanson over at Frontpage Magazine in 2004, and surely there's been a full analysis of the source of the materials that were flown to the US, and the materials that remain at Tuwaitha. I've been anxiously awaiting some media exposure--any media exposure as to this analysis, based on the "Bush lied" mantra of those who carped about the so-called fabricated intelligence about Iraq seeking uranium from Africa (Niger).
It would seem to me that regardless as to the source of the yellow cake, this was a major discovery that deserved some coverage...
That discovery was in addition to the many barrels of "pesticides" found all over Iraq, some of which was buried in ammunitions dumps, which gave people who were exposed to it the symptoms of being exposed to nerve agents.
The whole story quite simply isn't being told, but enough has been publicized that indicates that "no wmd" was debunked a long time ago--when we went into Iraq in 2003 and Dr. Obeidi turned over the components to his gas centrifuge and the plans (which could have falled into other more dangerous hands).
Couple all of that with the initiative to find meaningful work for the scientists who were working on his nuke program, and you have a pretty big and full picture of something very different than "no wmd".
God Bless you and your family, dadmanly.
Bah, blind faith goes both ways.
What was FOUND in Iraq was a total lack of surprises, and a no evidence useable WMDs. If it was about WMDs, North Korea should have been the target. An active nuclear program by a total nutter with zero international compliance trumps a heavily inspected, occasionally compliant nutter trying to maintain an aging chem/bio arsenal and wishing futily that Israel hadn't destroyed his nuclear program years before.
And yes, there was a very minimal at best WMD threat from Iraq, and similarly a very minor and regional sponsorship of terrorism with no proven or even likely signs of co-operation with Al Q.
What was FOUND in Iraq was a total lack of surprises, and a no evidence useable WMDs. If it was about WMDs, North Korea should have been the target. An active nuclear program by a total nutter with zero international compliance trumps a heavily inspected, occasionally compliant nutter trying to maintain an aging chem/bio arsenal and wishing futily that Israel hadn't destroyed his nuclear program years before.
And yes, there was a very minimal at best WMD threat from Iraq, and similarly a very minor and regional sponsorship of terrorism with no proven or even likely signs of co-operation with Al Q.
I think the UN does a lot better job than the US military. That's for sure. At least they know how to keep order. Right?
As the reasons for the war the lsit starts with:
Saddam Hussein's Defiance of United Nations Resolutions
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated sixteen United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) designed to ensure that Iraq does not pose a threat to international peace and security. In addition to these repeated violations, he has tried, over the past decade, to circumvent UN economic sanctions against Iraq, which are reflected in a number of other resolutions. As noted in the resolutions, Saddam Hussein was required to fulfill many obligations beyond the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Specifically, Saddam Hussein was required to, among other things: allow international weapons inspectors to oversee the destruction of his weapons of mass destruction; not develop new weapons of mass destruction; destroy all of his ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers; stop support for terrorism and prevent terrorist organizations from operating within Iraq; help account for missing Kuwaitis and other individuals; return stolen Kuwaiti property and bear financial liability for damage from the Gulf War; and he was required to end his repression of the Iraqi people. Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated each of the following resolutions:
UNSCR 678 - November 29, 1990
Iraq must comply fully with UNSCR 660 (regarding Iraq's illegal invasion of Kuwait) "and all subsequent relevant resolutions."
Authorizes UN Member States "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area."
UNSCR 686 - March 2, 1991
Iraq must release prisoners detained during the Gulf War.
Iraq must return Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf War.
Iraq must accept liability under international law for damages from its illegal invasion of Kuwait.
UNSCR 687 - April 3, 1991
Iraq must "unconditionally accept" the destruction, removal or rendering harmless "under international supervision" of all "chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities."
Iraq must "unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material" or any research, development or manufacturing facilities.
Iraq must "unconditionally accept" the destruction, removal or rendering harmless "under international supervision" of all "ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 KM and related major parts and repair and production facilities."
Iraq must not "use, develop, construct or acquire" any weapons of mass destruction.
Iraq must reaffirm its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Creates the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to verify the elimination of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs and mandated that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verify elimination of Iraq's nuclear weapons program.
Iraq must declare fully its weapons of mass destruction programs.
Iraq must not commit or support terrorism, or allow terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq.
Iraq must cooperate in accounting for the missing and dead Kuwaitis and others.
Iraq must return Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf War.
UNSCR 688 - April 5, 1991
"Condemns" repression of Iraqi civilian population, "the consequences of which threaten international peace and security."
Iraq must immediately end repression of its civilian population.
Iraq must allow immediate access to international humanitarian organizations to those in need of assistance.
UNSCR 707 - August 15, 1991
"Condemns" Iraq's "serious violation" of UNSCR 687.
"Further condemns" Iraq's noncompliance with IAEA and its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Iraq must halt nuclear activities of all kinds until the Security Council deems Iraq in full compliance.
Iraq must make a full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction and missile programs.
Iraq must allow UN and IAEA inspectors immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
Iraq must cease attempts to conceal or move weapons of mass destruction, and related materials and facilities.
Iraq must allow UN and IAEA inspectors to conduct inspection flights throughout Iraq.
Iraq must provide transportation, medical and logistical support for UN and IAEA inspectors.
UNSCR 715 - October 11, 1991
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors.
UNSCR 949 - October 15, 1994
"Condemns" Iraq's recent military deployments toward Kuwait.
Iraq must not utilize its military or other forces in a hostile manner to threaten its neighbors or UN operations in Iraq.
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors.
Iraq must not enhance its military capability in southern Iraq.
UNSCR 1051 - March 27, 1996
Iraq must report shipments of dual-use items related to weapons of mass destruction to the UN and IAEA.
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
UNSCR 1060 - June 12, 1996
"Deplores" Iraq's refusal to allow access to UN inspectors and Iraq's "clear violations" of previous UN resolutions.
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
UNSCR 1115 - June 21, 1997
"Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access" to UN inspectors, which constitutes a "clear and flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060.
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom UN inspectors want to interview.
UNSCR 1134 - October 23, 1997
"Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access" to UN inspectors, which constitutes a "flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060.
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom UN inspectors want to interview.
UNSCR 1137 - November 12, 1997
"Condemns the continued violations by Iraq" of previous UN resolutions, including its "implicit threat to the safety of" aircraft operated by UN inspectors and its tampering with UN inspector monitoring equipment.
Reaffirms Iraq's responsibility to ensure the safety of UN inspectors.
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
UNSCR 1154 - March 2, 1998
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access, and notes that any violation would have the "severest consequences for Iraq."
UNSCR 1194 - September 9, 1998
"Condemns the decision by Iraq of 5 August 1998 to suspend cooperation with" UN and IAEA inspectors, which constitutes "a totally unacceptable contravention" of its obligations under UNSCR 687, 707, 715, 1060, 1115, and 1154.
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA weapons inspectors, and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
UNSCR 1205 - November 5, 1998
"Condemns the decision by Iraq of 31 October 1998 to cease cooperation" with UN inspectors as "a flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687 and other resolutions.
Iraq must provide "immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation" with UN and IAEA inspectors.
UNSCR 1284 - December 17, 1999
Created the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace previous weapon inspection team (UNSCOM).
Iraq must allow UNMOVIC "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access" to Iraqi officials and facilities.
Iraq must fulfill its commitment to return Gulf War prisoners.
Calls on Iraq to distribute humanitarian goods and medical supplies to its people and address the needs of vulnerable Iraqis without discrimination.
Additional UN Security Council Statements
In addition to the legally binding UNSCRs, the UN Security Council has also issued at least 30 statements from the President of the UN Security Council regarding Saddam Hussein's continued violations of UNSCRs. The list of statements includes:
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 28, 1991
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, February 5, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, February 19, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, February 28, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, March 6, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, March 11, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, March 12, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, April 10, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 17, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, July 6, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, September 2, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, November 23, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, November 24, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, January 8, 1993
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, January 11, 1993
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 18, 1993
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 28, 1993
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, November 23, 1993
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, October 8, 1994
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, March 19, 1996
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 14, 1996
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, August 23, 1996
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, December 30, 1996
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 13, 1997
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, October 29, 1997
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, November 13, 1997
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, December 3, 1997
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, December 22, 1997
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, January 14, 1998
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Saddam Hussein's Defiance of United Nations Resolutions
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated sixteen United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) designed to ensure that Iraq does not pose a threat to international peace and security. In addition to these repeated violations, he has tried, over the past decade, to circumvent UN economic sanctions against Iraq, which are reflected in a number of other resolutions. As noted in the resolutions, Saddam Hussein was required to fulfill many obligations beyond the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Specifically, Saddam Hussein was required to, among other things: allow international weapons inspectors to oversee the destruction of his weapons of mass destruction; not develop new weapons of mass destruction; destroy all of his ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers; stop support for terrorism and prevent terrorist organizations from operating within Iraq; help account for missing Kuwaitis and other individuals; return stolen Kuwaiti property and bear financial liability for damage from the Gulf War; and he was required to end his repression of the Iraqi people. Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated each of the following resolutions:
UNSCR 678 - November 29, 1990
Iraq must comply fully with UNSCR 660 (regarding Iraq's illegal invasion of Kuwait) "and all subsequent relevant resolutions."
Authorizes UN Member States "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area."
UNSCR 686 - March 2, 1991
Iraq must release prisoners detained during the Gulf War.
Iraq must return Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf War.
Iraq must accept liability under international law for damages from its illegal invasion of Kuwait.
UNSCR 687 - April 3, 1991
Iraq must "unconditionally accept" the destruction, removal or rendering harmless "under international supervision" of all "chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities."
Iraq must "unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material" or any research, development or manufacturing facilities.
Iraq must "unconditionally accept" the destruction, removal or rendering harmless "under international supervision" of all "ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 KM and related major parts and repair and production facilities."
Iraq must not "use, develop, construct or acquire" any weapons of mass destruction.
Iraq must reaffirm its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Creates the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to verify the elimination of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs and mandated that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verify elimination of Iraq's nuclear weapons program.
Iraq must declare fully its weapons of mass destruction programs.
Iraq must not commit or support terrorism, or allow terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq.
Iraq must cooperate in accounting for the missing and dead Kuwaitis and others.
Iraq must return Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf War.
UNSCR 688 - April 5, 1991
"Condemns" repression of Iraqi civilian population, "the consequences of which threaten international peace and security."
Iraq must immediately end repression of its civilian population.
Iraq must allow immediate access to international humanitarian organizations to those in need of assistance.
UNSCR 707 - August 15, 1991
"Condemns" Iraq's "serious violation" of UNSCR 687.
"Further condemns" Iraq's noncompliance with IAEA and its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Iraq must halt nuclear activities of all kinds until the Security Council deems Iraq in full compliance.
Iraq must make a full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction and missile programs.
Iraq must allow UN and IAEA inspectors immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
Iraq must cease attempts to conceal or move weapons of mass destruction, and related materials and facilities.
Iraq must allow UN and IAEA inspectors to conduct inspection flights throughout Iraq.
Iraq must provide transportation, medical and logistical support for UN and IAEA inspectors.
UNSCR 715 - October 11, 1991
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors.
UNSCR 949 - October 15, 1994
"Condemns" Iraq's recent military deployments toward Kuwait.
Iraq must not utilize its military or other forces in a hostile manner to threaten its neighbors or UN operations in Iraq.
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors.
Iraq must not enhance its military capability in southern Iraq.
UNSCR 1051 - March 27, 1996
Iraq must report shipments of dual-use items related to weapons of mass destruction to the UN and IAEA.
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
UNSCR 1060 - June 12, 1996
"Deplores" Iraq's refusal to allow access to UN inspectors and Iraq's "clear violations" of previous UN resolutions.
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
UNSCR 1115 - June 21, 1997
"Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access" to UN inspectors, which constitutes a "clear and flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060.
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom UN inspectors want to interview.
UNSCR 1134 - October 23, 1997
"Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access" to UN inspectors, which constitutes a "flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060.
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom UN inspectors want to interview.
UNSCR 1137 - November 12, 1997
"Condemns the continued violations by Iraq" of previous UN resolutions, including its "implicit threat to the safety of" aircraft operated by UN inspectors and its tampering with UN inspector monitoring equipment.
Reaffirms Iraq's responsibility to ensure the safety of UN inspectors.
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
UNSCR 1154 - March 2, 1998
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access, and notes that any violation would have the "severest consequences for Iraq."
UNSCR 1194 - September 9, 1998
"Condemns the decision by Iraq of 5 August 1998 to suspend cooperation with" UN and IAEA inspectors, which constitutes "a totally unacceptable contravention" of its obligations under UNSCR 687, 707, 715, 1060, 1115, and 1154.
Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA weapons inspectors, and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
UNSCR 1205 - November 5, 1998
"Condemns the decision by Iraq of 31 October 1998 to cease cooperation" with UN inspectors as "a flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687 and other resolutions.
Iraq must provide "immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation" with UN and IAEA inspectors.
UNSCR 1284 - December 17, 1999
Created the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace previous weapon inspection team (UNSCOM).
Iraq must allow UNMOVIC "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access" to Iraqi officials and facilities.
Iraq must fulfill its commitment to return Gulf War prisoners.
Calls on Iraq to distribute humanitarian goods and medical supplies to its people and address the needs of vulnerable Iraqis without discrimination.
Additional UN Security Council Statements
In addition to the legally binding UNSCRs, the UN Security Council has also issued at least 30 statements from the President of the UN Security Council regarding Saddam Hussein's continued violations of UNSCRs. The list of statements includes:
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 28, 1991
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, February 5, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, February 19, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, February 28, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, March 6, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, March 11, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, March 12, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, April 10, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 17, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, July 6, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, September 2, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, November 23, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, November 24, 1992
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, January 8, 1993
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, January 11, 1993
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 18, 1993
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 28, 1993
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, November 23, 1993
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, October 8, 1994
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, March 19, 1996
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 14, 1996
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, August 23, 1996
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, December 30, 1996
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 13, 1997
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, October 29, 1997
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, November 13, 1997
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, December 3, 1997
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, December 22, 1997
UN Security Council Presidential Statement, January 14, 1998
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