In important commentary today, David Ignatius at Real Clear Politics buttresses Petraeus and Crocker pointed testimony about Iranian trouble-making in Iraq, and makes a sober assessment of what awaits the next President:

Fighting a war against Iran is a bad idea. But fighting a proxy war against them in Iraq, where many of our key allies are manipulated by Iranian networks of influence, may be even worse. The best argument for keeping American troops in Iraq is that it increases our leverage against Iran; but paradoxically, that's also a good argument for reducing U.S. troops to a level that's politically and militarily sustainable. It could give America greater freedom of maneuver in the tests with Iran that are ahead.

Somehow, the next president will have to fuse U.S. military and diplomatic power to both engage Iran and set limits on its activities. A U.S.-Iranian dialogue is a necessary condition for future stability in the Middle East. But the wrong deal, negotiated by a weak America with a cocky Iran that thinks it's on a roll, would be a disaster.

I think Ignatius has this just about right, but I’d take it to the next logical conclusion. John McCain certainly recognizes the threat posed by Al Qaeda, as well as Iranian proxy sponsorship of terror groups, terrorists, and militia adversaries of both US forces and Iraq (however often he stumbles around trying to correctly label all the players).

Obama, on the other hand, never reveals a thorough understanding of the threats we face, or how seriously they threaten. I have great certainty that Obama would be more than capable of serving as proximate cause of a “weak America” negotiating the “wrong deal” with a “cocky Iran that thinks it’s on a roll.”

If the Bush Administration can be plausibly accused of over-simplifying threats and enemies to the point of caricature, its critics and opposition should be likewise accountable for thinking they can dispatch them like cartoon villains. To foreign policy neophytes like Obama, our sworn enemies will always act rationally, behave in farsighted self-interest, deal honestly, and respect conventional norms. (Or be quickly beaten or bombed into submission, if only a Brilliant Democrat takes on the task.)

Fatally for such who harbor these illusions, enemies in the real world are not so easily vanquished. Pity, Sen. Obama’s first hand experience with NY’s junior Senator, doesn’t better inform his understanding of adversaries in conflict.

(Via Memeorandum)

The Washington Post this weekend published a notable op-ed, Getting Beyond Stalemate to Win a War,” jointly authored by retired Major General (MG) John Batiste and Vets for Freedom Executive Director Pete Hegseth.

Hegseth, who’s been tireless in his efforts this year in leading the media fight for victory and against surrender in the war in Iraq, presented quite a contrast with Batiste. Batiste the former 1^st Infantry Division Commander, publicly trumpeted starkly negative assessments of our efforts in Iraq this past year. At the time, immediately pre-election, the timing and vehemence of his opposition, his emphasis on subjective opinion versus military facts on the ground, all struck me as nakedly partisan and opportunist.

All the more remarkable that Hegseth and Batiste contributed jointly to this opinion piece. Hegseth notified Vets for Freedom supporters (I’m on their National Leadership Team) that, notwithstanding any prior political differences, Batiste is a “true patriot.” Here’s how Hegseth explains their work together for the WaPo op-ed:

The op-ed outlines the need for America to succeed in Iraq, as well as in the Long War against radical Islam.
As you may know, in 2006 Maj. Gen. Batiste was an outspoken critic of failed strategies in Iraq. However, to his great credit, he now believes we must stop "prosecuting the past," recognize the success of the new strategy, and focus on victory. I could not agree more!
My sincere hope is that this op-ed will help serve as a sort of "political reconciliation" in our own country. It is time to put aside petty partisan differences, and rally behind the need for success in Iraq and in the Long War.
It was an honor to write the piece with Maj. Gen. Batiste—he is a fine officer and a true patriot.

If Hegseth can make this statement about Batiste, at the least I can reconsider any earlier judgment I made about him. In any case, Hegseth and Batiste make a strong argument for reconciliation of oppositional national security views, and victory in Iraq:

Our military men and women deserve better than partisan politics; they deserve honest assessments of our nation's performance in fighting the Long War.
We are veterans of the Iraq war with vastly different experiences. Both of us commanded troops in Iraq. We, too, held seemingly entrenched, and incompatible, views upon our return. One of us spoke out against mismanagement of the war -- failed leadership, lack of strategy and misdirection. The other championed the cause of successfully completing our mission.
Our perspectives were different, yet not as stark as the "outspoken general" and "stay-the-course supporter" labels we received. Such labels are oversimplified and inaccurate, and we are united behind a greater purpose.
It's time to discuss the way forward rather than prosecute the past. Congress must do the same, for our nation and the troops.

As I’ve stated many times, who knows how much easier this fight might have been, if serious and security minded Democrats had held sway, and kept the anti-war rhetoric well-tempered by a “politics stop at the water’s edge” philosophy. (How about this for a post-9/11 version of same, “politics stop at ground zero’s debris field.”)

Hegseth and Batiste energetically embrace the concept of the Long War that we fight against radical Islamic extremism, and call for concerted, unified American effort against or terrorist enemies in five key areas, as excerpted:

·        The United States must be successful in the fight against worldwide Islamic extremism.

·        Iraq cannot become a staging ground for Islamic extremism or be dominated by other powers in the region, such as Iran and Syria.

·        The counterinsurgency campaign led by Gen. David Petraeus is the correct approach in Iraq.

·        No matter what, Iran must not be permitted to become a nuclear power.

·        Our military capabilities need to match our national strategy.

Hegseth and Batiste assert that Veterans are resolved in their defense of this nation, and make one additional plea:

America's veterans -- young and old -- are resolved to support and defend the Constitution from all enemies, foreign and domestic. This commitment, and nothing less, should compel us to stand together, in and out of uniform. Would that Congress finds the courage to bury its pride and do the same.

This should have been the stand taken in 2003, and long overdue in 2007, but perhaps it marks an important (and essential) turning point in political rhetoric.

I view it as inevitable that all those who formerly spoke of defeat, withdrawal, quagmire, blunders, will need to reposition for 2008. The writing’s on the wall. Those who cling to the defeat narrative will be punished severely; if not by an electorate, then by those who position with an electorate in mind.

Here’s a tactical question. How much cover do you extend to people who still have political interests in opposition to your own? Does it make them look foolish, or embarrassed that they were wrong? Is that enough to weaken them?

One issue is who holds the White House in 2009. Another is, no matter who wins, how will the military be treated? Are they going to listen to us, next time things get tough? How will we be used? Will we keep fighting the Long War, with leaders who will make tough decisions?

I'd vote whole-heartedly for reconciliation, if I had any confidence that those on the other side were genuine in their "new awareness" and serious about the real, abiding threats we face.

The Long War Journal presents an absolutely must-read on current covert Iranian military operations against Iraq, whose operations Roggio calls the Ramazan Corps. Yes, such things exist, according to the US military, as reported by Roggio:

Multinational Forces Iraq learned that Iran set up the Ramazan Corps as a sophisticated command structure to coordinate military, intelligence, terrorist, diplomatic, religious, ideological, propaganda, and economic operations.

You’ve got to go there now and check out the Flash presentation, as well as read Roggio’s full report. Call it an Iran Battle Update Brief (BUB) for Dummies (like me).

Eye opening. Seriously resets the context of recent reporting about the highly politicized and controversial NIE on Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

War by any and all means at their disposal, seems to me.

(Via Uncle Jimbo at Blackfive)

Our local high school has been hosting a Participation in Government speaker series. On Wednesday, November 28, they hosted a session on Pre-emptive War, the War in Iraq, and a potential War with Iran, with former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter. Until this week, efforts to “find” an additional speaker with contrasting views had been unsuccessful. Then a fellow parent shared with me about his appearance, discussed my willingness to step forward, and they asked me to participate.

The format allowed each of us 10 minutes to present our views on the three topics in turn, followed by student questions. I started. I used a brief outline, Ritter appeared to speak extemporaneously. Students and an adult or two asked questions, and towards the end the teacher who organizes the sessions augmented with questions of his own. Most allowed both of us to respond, but most were primarily directed at Ritter, but he was often offered to let me lead in response and I always had an opportunity to rebut or otherwise offer my own response.

My first impression of Ritter was of a very professional and courteous, even likeable man. His military background is evident. He was very respectful during the entire exchange, and had researched me at least as thoroughly as I researched him.

Here’s an outline of what I presented to open the session:

Pre-emptive War:

Just War Concept -- the morality of war

Why and How wars start

Aggressive, reactive, retributive, pre-emptive

Cold War, MAD, emergence of terrorism

Lessons from September 11^th:

War as Risk Management

Threat of Nuclear proliferation, other WMD

Terror as proxy for state to state warfare

Potentially catastrophic cost of inaction

The War in Iraq:

Gulf War and “Cessation” of Hostilities

UN Security Council Resolutions (1991-2002)

Iraq Regime Change as official US policy (1998)

9/11 Aftermath, change in strategy:

Waiting for imminence can be catastrophic

State sponsors of terror, “safe harbor” & terror proxies

WMD Proliferation as terror threat

Middle East and Regional Threats

Human Rights and Democracy Promotion

Pre- and Post-Invasion Intelligence

Possible War with Iran:

Iran “at war” with US since 1979

Iranian proxies: Hezbollah, Shiite Militias

Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFP)

IEDs, weapons, funding, terrorist training

Regional influence & destabilization

Human Rights and Democratization

Iranian nuclear program:

Financial & technical resources driven by intent

Repeated obstruction and deception towards IAEA

Avowed aim the obliteration of Israel

Concerns about proliferation, “nuke by proxy”

Ritter centered his 10 minutes on the premise that the US signed international treaties, that those treaties take on the force of law, that he “swore an oath” to defend and support the constitution (he made very forceful declarations along these lines often). He quoted UN Charter, explained the prescribed military actions that the UN holds member countries can take that would be “legal” and “lawful.” He placed the entire issue of us going to war (previously in Iraq or in future in Iran or elsewhere) completely in the context of international treaty, UN mandate, with only cursory mention of the US Constitution or US war powers and authority.

I later challenged that formulation on the basis of US national sovereignty, and that the US can never sign a treaty that can abridge rights and powers granted by the Constitution (surely he can’t be enforced, either, without loss of national sovereignty. Ritter then seemed to reorient his line of reasoning to address what he felt were the unconstitutional aspects of our military actions in Iraq (and even Afghanistan).

I highlighted that for several decades, and all modern wars (since WWII), all three branches of Government have been complicit in allowing Congress to abrogate its Constitutional obligations to declare war (War Powers Act), Congressional authorizations for Presidential use of military force, etc. Hold Congress to its obligations, I’d agree, but to allow Congress to then escape responsibility and only blame the President is allowing those complicit to evade responsibility twice: first in the votes to authorize, then second in turning around and blaming the President with the results, as if they were innocent bystanders.

Ritter obviously tailored what might have been a different, more strident kind of presentation, were he not before a student audience. It really was a good, vigorous debate. He knows his UN Charter, for sure, perhaps more than he knows his Constitution, but he knows better than I, though I’m certain he cherry picks from the US defining documents. He is quite passionate and forceful, makes effective argument, and it’s hard to argue against his resume. I’m glad I didn’t. Despite his later claims to cherish US Sovereignty (“we don’t need the UN or other international problems to fix things we did ourselves, the American people can do that ourselves”), Rittre clearly buys in to the whole UN as final arbiter for Right and Wrong and international law. I responded by describing UN involvement in wars, peacekeeping as absolute disasters that usually make matters worse: UN corruption, violence, criminal activities, other malfeasance.

He made the claim that we made Al Qaeda stronger, that we haven’t beaten them anywhere, that we discredited ourselves and our ideals by our actions. He responded to questions about Guantanamo, torture, Geneva Conventions, and our standing legally, internationally, in harsh terms. Illegal, immoral, and he would immediately close Gitmo and prosecute anyone guilty of torture.

I replied with a fuller explanation of what Geneva means to signatories and non-signatories, the significance of unlawful combatants, how to conceptually deal with terrorists as POWs, when you can’t have prisoner exchanges or terms of surrender with non-state, unlawful combatants or even with the militaries of non-signatory countries. Problematic, and in other eras, such people found on the battlefield were summarily executed, and the Geneva Conventions can be found to approve of such actions. (Not that I advocate same, but that’s the problem, isn’t it?)

I also said there’s one place that we actually DID defeat Al Qaeda: Iraq. We have decimated them there, handed their hats to them, and they have suffered a terrible public relations and psychological defeat – which is the only plane on which they could ever be successful. Our military might, coupled with Iraqi resolve and citizen rejection of their foreign terrorists – smashed Al Qaeda. So much for their invincibility.

I found myself time and again returning to the context of decisions, viewing decisions in light of potential, known and unknown threats. I stressed repeatedly that we are already at war, were already at war, and that our enemies used (and use) terror proxies to do what they can’t or won’t do explicitly, openly, with their military forces. State sponsors of terror, in many ways, are more dangerous than the minions they fund, sponsor, host, hide, and direct. Safe havens should be of great concern, and nuclear and other WMD proliferation is a grave threat.

As I stated several times, there is a potentially catastrophic cost of inaction, which serious minded leaders must confront. (And do, when they are in the decision seat.)

Just based on a search I did yesterday, Ritter appeared less than 2 months ago in a college forum in Syracuse. He had appeared in a couple of forums hosted by the local public television station. As he arrived today, Ritter stated that he had earlier that day appeared at a similar forum, likewise sponsored by the local PBS affiliate. He told me that such forums often consist entirely of like-minded speakers, rather than people with contrasting views.

New Yorker luminary Seymour Hersh documents a purported “shift in targeting” by the President amid heightened tensions between the US and Iran, writing in The New Yorker. Hersh, at his most workmanlike in this piece, methodically builds a case in support of a careful Bush Administration campaign to make sure the US goes to war in Iran:

In a series of public statements in recent months, President Bush and members of his Administration have redefined the war in Iraq, to an increasing degree, as a strategic battle between the United States and Iran. “Shia extremists, backed by Iran, are training Iraqis to carry out attacks on our forces and the Iraqi people,” Bush told the national convention of the American Legion in August. “The attacks on our bases and our troops by Iranian-supplied munitions have increased. . . . The Iranian regime must halt these actions. And, until it does, I will take actions necessary to protect our troops.” He then concluded, to applause, “I have authorized our military commanders in Iraq to confront Tehran’s murderous activities.”

The President’s position, and its corollary—that, if many of America’s problems in Iraq are the responsibility of Tehran, then the solution to them is to confront the Iranians—have taken firm hold in the Administration. This summer, the White House, pushed by the office of Vice-President Dick Cheney, requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff redraw long-standing plans for a possible attack on Iran, according to former officials and government consultants. The focus of the plans had been a broad bombing attack, with targets including Iran’s known and suspected nuclear facilities and other military and infrastructure sites. Now the emphasis is on “surgical” strikes on Revolutionary Guard Corps facilities in Tehran and elsewhere, which, the Administration claims, have been the source of attacks on Americans in Iraq. What had been presented primarily as a counter-proliferation mission has been reconceived as counterterrorism.

As always, the bluff of Hersh’s assertions greatly exceeds the bluster of his reporting.

Hersh can always be counted on to tell a complex story with skill and dexterity, just as he can always be counted on to embellish his references with carefully targeted rhetorical excesses. Of course, Hersh maintains the disciplined appearance of objectivity, finding among unnamed sources in Federal bureaucracies, useful co-conspirators with ready anti-Administration gossip and other sound bites.

No doubt these are driven currently by anti-Bush animus, as in days of yore, when Hersh attacked prior Republican administrations. Iraq and Iran must serve as thin gruel indeed. Compared to Vietnam, where Hersh first rose to international prominence for his anti-war reporting. One almost feels sorry for the old war horse.

None of which necessarily speaks to the accuracy of his reporting, but rather to the obviousness of his biases.

Hersh wants his readers to believe that the President has decided he must scapegoat Iran at this particular time in this particular way – a change from any previous planning – because of three “developments”:

- The failure of a “campaign” to convince the public that Iran poses an imminent nuclear threat;

- Consensus within the Intelligence Community (IC) that Iran is at least 5 years away from developing nuclear weapons; and

- Recognition that Iran is the “geopolitical winner” in Iraq.

The first purported “development,” of course, highlights how Bush and his advisors want to “do Iraq” all over again, something Hersh states plainly. Not being content to suffer enormous political fallout, lost elections and lost control of both Houses of Congress from one Iraq, Hersh wants to believe (and wants credulous readers to believe) that Bush and Company desperately want another. (“Desperately seeking Quagmire,” I suppose.)

The second “development” suggests a parallel between Iran’s nuclear ambitions, programs, and level of threat, compared to Hussein in 2002. Hersh clearly wants to throw down the gauntlet, “not this time” -- as if the worries and concerns about Iranian apocalyptic rhetoric and stunning advances in nuclear technology procurement and weaponization, just more of the same Lie Us Into War strategy.

The problem here is that there is anything but consensus on how far Iran has advanced in the nuclear weapons program, or the extent to which they were assisted by Pakistan’s rogue nuclearists or North Korea’s obvious desire to proliferate nuclear weapons or weapon making capability. We’ll know how far they are when they test their first nuke, probably not before.

No doubt, the League of Former Senior Intelligence and CIA Officials who Oppose Bush  have reached a firm consensus that everything he does is wrong and always for the wrong reasons, whereas everything They Think is Right and always in the Interest of National Security -- never petty politics or bureaucratic turf battle or in-fighting. Surely the same can be said of Hersh, who’s never met an unnamed official he couldn’t find compelling and convincing, provided the official gave him anti-Administration quotes.

The third “development,” that Iran is the geopolitical winner in Iraq is not only highly arguable, but highly doubtful as a conclusion that this administration might reach. I have no doubt at all that Hersh pushes this line of reasoning, the better to justify his steadfast conclusion that nothing good can come from our efforts in Iraq. In this, he’s joined by many of his cooperating unnamed officials, many in the Foreign Policy establishment, and a proliferation of academics, bound and determined to stand as apologists for the regime in Tehran.

Iran may or may not be in a better regional situation for a variety of reasons because of our efforts in Iraq. Likewise, our efforts at eliminating the Taliban and Saddam and introducing democracy to the Arab Middle East surely present a serious threat to the stability and survival of the Mullahcracy in Iran.

If one could portray the President’s heightened focus on Iran as desperate, as an acknowledgement of losing ground, as Hersh implies here, the same could certainly be said of Iran’s intense meddling in Iraq.

It’s almost humorous how critics of this administration manage to slam the President on both sides of these kinds of issues: negligence and not seeing the real threats; then paying too much attention or “hyping” those same threats.

Hersh favors the rhetorical device of mixing in military and political commentary when quoting his unnamed sources. I do not suggest that Hersh manufactures quotes. Rather, he regularly quotes presumed experts in one area who Hersh oddly calls upon to draw conclusions outside their areas of expertise.

As Hersh does here, quoting a “former intelligence official”:

“There is a desperate effort by Cheney et al. to bring military action to Iran as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the politicians are saying, ‘You can’t do it, because every Republican is going to be defeated, and we’re only one fact from going over the cliff in Iraq.’ But Cheney doesn’t give a rat’s ass about the Republican worries, and neither does the President.”

That’s highly speculative. And highly suspect. I seriously doubt many Republicans think this might be true, although one hears this kind of thing quite often from liberal Democrats. I’m also not sure there are many former intelligence officials who can or should be quoted authoritatively on matters of politics, or of organizational psychology, but then I’m no Seymour Hersh.

Hersh, as many foul weather critics of this Administration, points to heightened or increased operation analysis and planning as evidence of intent or mission selection. Hersh points to increased “tempo of attack planning” and increased staffing, and draws another helpful (unnamed) CIA source to compare these efforts to pre-war preparations for Iraq in 2002.

There are a few other possibilities, as any military commander or Intelligence Analyst could tell you, even without remaining anonymous.

One very strong possibility is that the US knows that our analytic understanding about Iran, its nuclear and military capabilities, is weak, and needs to get better. Whatever intelligence gaps we had about Iraq prior to going to war, and that we had about North Korea before they went nuclear, we can be assured that we have al least as many about Iran. That doesn’t suggest that Iran might take longer to reach the nuclear threshold, rather than sooner. Especially if Iran’s El Baradei is insisting it will take longer.

The majority of Hersh’s readership remains largely ignorant or ill-informed on military matters (no thanks to Hersh). The military plans on a continuous basis for all conceivable threats and multiple areas of operations. Intelligence assets anticipate potential hot spots and operational requirements, and seek to build understanding, fill gaps, and expand intelligence holdings. We certainly should be concentrating on Iran, not because we’ve already decided to attack, but because of all the threats out there today, Iran is among the most bellicose, and Iranian actions (including acts of war) the most belligerent.

There is also the possibility that prior operational planning over-emphasized targeting of nuclear sites. For a variety of reasons, planning may now be including detailed threat assessments and potential target preparation for so called surgical strikes.

Not that any of this needs to detract from Hersh’s depiction of a White House on the march to war. This matches the conclusion drawn by former Carter National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (Foreign Policy realists breed strange bedfellows indeed.)

Of course Ahmadinejad blames the state of relations between the US and Iran entirely on US aggression. Brzezinski, in a similar vein, thinks the Bush Administration is hoping Iran keeps saber rattling for a reason, according to Brzezinski, via Hersh:

“A lot depends on how stupid the Iranians will be,” Brzezinski told me. “Will they cool off Ahmadinejad and tone down their language?” The Bush Administration, by charging that Iran was interfering in Iraq, was aiming “to paint it as ‘We’re responding to what is an intolerable situation,’ ” Brzezinski said. “This time, unlike the attack in Iraq, we’re going to play the victim. The name of our game seems to be to get the Iranians to overplay their hand.”

Brzezinski suggests that vile anti-Americanism is somehow more threatening or angering to the US than Iranian funding and training of anti-US terrorists, active targeting of US military, and the supply of shaped-charge munitions to our enemies for the express purpose of killing more Americans.

Hersh attempts to refute recent US accusations against Iranian support of insurgent and militia violence against US and coalition forces by introducing some doubt as to the provenance of arms thought to be of (recent) Iranian vintage. In this, he confers with former UN weapons inspector David Kay, who asserts that Inspection Teams found surprising and huge quantities of munitions, including “explosively formed penetrators.” These may not be the kinds of munitions now being used against US forces in Iraq, but surely existing known and unidentified munitions stockpiles are a large source for IEDs used in Iraq.

Kay believes General Petraeus and other military officials misstate the degree of current Iranian culpability, but his specific objections reveal a bias towards the “Iran reacts to US belligerence out of an enlightened self-interest:

“I thought Petraeus went way beyond what Iran is doing inside Iraq today,” Kay said. “When the White House started its anti-Iran campaign, six months ago, I thought it was all craziness. Now it does look like there is some selective smuggling by Iran, but much of it has been in response to American pressure and American threats—more a ‘shot across the bow’ sort of thing, to let Washington know that it was not going to get away with its threats so freely. Iran is not giving the Iraqis the good stuff—the anti-aircraft missiles that can shoot down American planes and its advanced anti-tank weapons.”

Iranian apologetics flourish among the UN intelligentsia like Kay and El Baradei, and such prove useful to Hersh’s contention that the US is hyping us into war with Iran. These same kind of internationalists display the kind of thinking that always justifies Iranian reaction, and even over-reaction, to the threats posed by the US.

A senior European diplomat, who works closely with American intelligence, told me that there is evidence that Iran has been making extensive preparation for an American bombing attack. “We know that the Iranians are strengthening their air-defense capabilities,” he said, “and we believe they will react asymmetrically—hitting targets in Europe and in Latin America.” There is also specific intelligence suggesting that Iran will be aided in these attacks by Hezbollah. “Hezbollah is capable, and they can do it,” the diplomat said.

All to make the argument in advance that whatever happens, the US and our attitudes towards Iran will have “caused” whatever results.

Hersh presents contrasting views of the root causes of violence against coalition forces. Hersh contrasts the US and UK military view that Iran supports many groups in the south who kill British and American soldiers, with international think tank assessments that violence results more from “the systematic abuse of official institutions, political assassinations, tribal vendettas, neighborhood vigilantism and enforcement of social mores, together with the rise of criminal mafias.”

Hersh’s international sources also quite rightly observe that corrupt Iraqi politicians often use accusatiosn of foreign intrigue as a way of diverting attention from corruption and outright criminality.

Hersh, as other critics, aligns himself with Shiite apologia that consistently evaluates every coalition strategy in the zero sum game of tribal politics: anything benefiting Sunnis is necessarily cause for Shiite concern.

 “The American policy of supporting the Sunnis in western Iraq is making the Shia leadership very nervous,” Nasr said. “The White House makes it seem as if the Shia were afraid only of Al Qaeda—but they are afraid of the Sunni tribesmen we are arming. The Shia attitude is ‘So what if you’re getting rid of Al Qaeda?’ The problem of Sunni resistance is still there. The Americans believe they can distinguish between good and bad insurgents, but the Shia don’t share that distinction. For the Shia, they are all one adversary.”

Nasr went on, “The United States is trying to fight on all sides—Sunni and Shia—and be friends with all sides.” In the Shiite view, “It’s clear that the United States cannot bring security to Iraq, because it is not doing everything necessary to bring stability. If they did, they would talk to anybody to achieve it—even Iran and Syria,” Nasr said. (Such engagement was a major recommendation of the Iraq Study Group.) “America cannot bring stability in Iraq by fighting Iran in Iraq.”

It is no small coincidence that this line of Shiite-oriented, tribal analysis always points towards closer diplomacy with Iran as the solution to all ills in Iraq. You will never read of an analyst making these kinds of assessment ever criticizing Iranian provocations, or their sins of commission or omission causing damage to US-Iranian relations, or for that matter, Iranian-Iraqi relations. One inevitably concludes that such voices are pro-Iranian, for a reason.

Hersh juices up his critique with highly detailed speculations (or intelligence leaks) from more of those un-named officials, detailing the form surgical strikes would take, and the almost single-minded desire of Vice President Cheney to have them carried out.

In framing the case that the US is preparing to conduct more limited, surgical strikes against Iran, Hersh consults with an anonymous European official, who Hersh quotes authoritatively on British support for a change in targeting:

A senior European official told me, “The British perception is that the Iranians are not making the progress they want to see in their nuclear-enrichment processing. All the intelligence community agree that Iran is providing critical assistance, training, and technology to a surprising number of terrorist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, and, through Hezbollah, in Lebanon, and Israel/Palestine, too.”

There were four possible responses to this Iranian activity, the European official said: to do nothing (“There would be no retaliation to the Iranians for their attacks; this would be sending the wrong signal”); to publicize the Iranian actions (“There is one great difficulty with this option—the widespread lack of faith in American intelligence assessments”); to attack the Iranians operating inside Iraq (“We’ve been taking action since last December, and it does have an effect”); or, finally, to attack inside Iran.

The European official continued, “A major air strike against Iran could well lead to a rallying around the flag there, but a very careful targeting of terrorist training camps might not.” His view, he said, was that “once the Iranians get a bloody nose they rethink things.” For example, Ali Akbar Rafsanjani and Ali Larijani, two of Iran’s most influential political figures, “might go to the Supreme Leader and say, ‘The hard-line policies have got us into this mess. We must change our approach for the sake of the regime.’ ”

The logic here is hard to follow. A big attack against Iran or its nuclear facilities would cause Iranians to rally to the regime, but a smaller attack might cause the grown ups in Tehran to pressure changes in Iranian behavior? Too many critics of the Bush Administration and current US foreign policy predicate their thinking on the assumption that US planners are all imbeciles, or nefarious.

Yet another unnamed European diplomat – don’t these gentlemen have work to do in Brussels or Paris? – passes along the related French opinion that changed US plans for Iran are mere face saving for mis-steps in Iraq:

Many in the French government have concluded that the Bush Administration has exaggerated the extent of Iranian meddling inside Iraq; they believe, according to a European diplomat, that “the American problems in Iraq are due to their own mistakes, and now the Americans are trying to show some teeth. An American bombing will show only that the Bush Administration has its own agenda toward Iran.”

A European intelligence official made a similar point. “If you attack Iran,” he told me, “and do not label it as being against Iran’s nuclear facilities, it will strengthen the regime, and help to make the Islamic air in the Middle East thicker.”

Assuming one can correctly interpret what “make the Islamic air in the Middle East thicker” means, would that even be possible? I thought Bin Ladenism, coupled with the extreme anti-Semitism, 12^th Imam evoking, Caliphate restoring rhetoric already made the Islamic air about as thick as it could get. Not in the eyes of some, who must see the US at fault for every negative turn of events in the Middle East.

Hersh makes sure to include commentary by Mohamed El Baradei and the IAEA:

The director general of the I.A.E.A., Mohamed ElBaradei, has for years been in an often bitter public dispute with the Bush Administration; the agency’s most recent report found that Iran was far less proficient in enriching uranium than expected. A diplomat in Vienna, where the I.A.E.A. is based, said, “The Iranians are years away from making a bomb, as ElBaradei has said all along. Running three thousand centrifuges does not make a bomb.” The diplomat added, referring to hawks in the Bush Administration, “They don’t like ElBaradei, because they are in a state of denial. And now their negotiating policy has failed, and Iran is still enriching uranium and still making progress.”

The diplomat expressed the bitterness that has marked the I.A.E.A.’s dealings with the Bush Administration since the buildup to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. “The White House’s claims were all a pack of lies, and Mohamed is dismissive of those lies,” the diplomat said.

Hans Blix, a former head of the I.A.E.A., questioned the Bush Administration’s commitment to diplomacy. “There are important cards that Washington could play; instead, they have three aircraft carriers sitting in the Persian Gulf,” he said. Speaking of Iran’s role in Iraq, Blix added, “My impression is that the United States has been trying to push up the accusations against Iran as a basis for a possible attack—as an excuse for jumping on them.”

When a commentator quotes El Baradei or Hans Blix in support of an argument, more thoughtful readers should know what’s coming.

That members of the IAEA continue to insist that US accusations about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, programs for WMD, intentions, and known and documented violations of UNSC resolutions were “all a pack of lies,” that tells you everything you need to know about the IAEA. El Baradei and the IAEA carried water for Saddam Hussein, and now they carry water for Iran. Can’t let anything stand in the way of the Islamic Bomb, can we?

That’s as much as I can stomach for one outing.

Via Mudville Gazette. Greyhawk also noted the Hersh report at MILBLOGS, and tries to decide if the story is batsh** crazy.

Charles Krauthammer speculates in the Washington Post on a recent Israeli air strike in Northern Syria, and suggests that North Korea was providing means, material, or expert assistance in helping Syria acquire nuclear capability. If they did, their actions would make an absolute mockery of international efforts to verify North Korea’s professed willingness to abandon their nuclear ambitions and surrender any nuclear capabilities.

Krauthammer offers some intriguing circumstantial evidence for North Korea’s perfidy:

Circumstantial evidence points to this being an attack on some nuclear facility provided by North Korea.

Three days earlier, a freighter flying the North Korean flag docked in the Syrian port city of Tartus with a shipment of "cement." Long way to go for cement. Within days, a top State Department official warned that "there may have been contact between Syria and some secret suppliers for nuclear equipment." Three days later, the six-party meeting on dismantling North Korea's nuclear facilities scheduled for Sept. 19 was suddenly postponed, officially by China, almost certainly at the behest of North Korea.

Apart from the usual suspects -- Syria, Iran, Libya and Russia -- only two countries registered strong protests to the Israeli strike: Turkey and North Korea. Turkey we can understand. Its military may have permitted Israel an overflight corridor without ever having told the Islamist civilian government. But North Korea? What business is this of North Korea's? Unless it was a North Korean facility being hit.

Krauthammer also notes a widely underreported account of the misadventures of a joint Syrian and Iranian chemical weapon program:

Second, there are ominous implications for the Middle East. Syria has long had chemical weapons -- on Monday, Jane's Defence Weekly reported on an accident that killed dozens of Syrians and Iranians loading a nerve-gas warhead onto a Syrian missile -- but Israel will not tolerate a nuclear Syria.

It would certainly remain possible that such evidence might convince the harshest critics to drop their objections that President Bush ever formulated his ‘Axis of Evil’ locution, or their sharp rebuttals against including the Dear Leader and his slave state in the axis. It should, but it won’t.

Those who oppose Bush foreign policy, after all, do so less on the basis of fact than on the basis of myth. Myths are essential to the world view that imagines that George Bush created anti-American animus where formerly there was none, that the aggressiveness of Bush foreign policy has created terror where there would be none, and that Nations in acting in their own perceived self-interest can never be interpreted to have committed crimes against humanity, or conducted acts of war against the US, our allies, or our vital national interests.

Central to all such myth-making is the moral irrelevancy of the behavior of any Nation State, save our own, which retains full culpability for all errors real or perceived, while other nations can only be our victims.

(Via Memeorandum)

Andy McCarthy at NRO tips us off to a NY Times article, reporting a recent seizure of an Iranian arms shipment to the Taliban in Afghanistan.

In further commentary, McCarthy highlights a Thomas Joscelyn piece from a year ago that explored earlier evidence of Iranian cooperation with the Taliban:

Tom Joscelyn wrote this Weekly Standard piece a year ago about a high-ranking Taliban detainee at Gitmo who has acknowledged providing security for a meeting between Taliban leaders and Iranian officials in the weeks after 9/11, during which Iran pledged to help the Taliban in its war against the U.S.  As Tom details, there is great reason to believe Iran has made good on this pledge — including by letting Taliban and Qaeda fighters escape into Iran after the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in October 2001.

Conventional wisdom from foreign affairs analysts and intelligence community types, of course, is that Iran despises the Taliban and, consequently, is likely to be “even more” helpful to us in Afghanistan than the Iraq Study Group farcically assumes it could be in Iraq.  Maybe we should reassess, no?

Needless to say, these kinds of analytic prejudices gravely degrade the quality of the analysis of these same “foreign affairs analysts and intelligence community types.” Oddly, said same prejudices are mandatory requirements for employment as a foreign policy advisor for the Democratic Party. (“Madame Speaker, your prejudice is showing.”)

Michael Gordon begins the Times report by revealing that Iranian Arms were seized, that they were bound for the Taliban, but the Pentagon’s top General remains reluctant to accuse the Government of Iran for official military support of the Taliban:

It was the first time that a senior American official had asserted that Iranian-made weapons were being supplied to the Taliban. But Gen. Peter Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said it was not clear if the Iranian government had authorized the shipment.

“We have intercepted weapons in Afghanistan headed for the Taliban that were made in Iran,” General Pace told reporters. “It’s not as clear in Afghanistan which Iranian entity is responsible.”

The shipment involved mortars and plastic explosives and was seized within the past month near the southern Afghan city of Kandahar. Markings on the plastic explosive material indicated that it was produced in Iran, General Pace said.

Some experts will want to share GEN Pace’s reluctance to blame the Iranian Government directly, rather than non-state or internal miscreants. After all, as Gordon notes, Iran supported the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, and backed the choice of President Hamid Karzai. But times have changed since the fall of the Taliban, and Iranian interests have as well. Gordon captures two perspectives on the probable change in Iran’s intentions:

But as relations between Iran and the United States have become more confrontational, some intelligence reports have indicated that the Revolutionary Guards might arm the Taliban in order to weaken and tie down the American military in Afghanistan.

Bush administration officials have repeatedly argued that Iran has been seeking to become the dominant power in the Middle East. Some experts, however, assert that the Iranian strategy may be defensive.

“The overall Iranian role has been to work closely with us to bring Karzai into power,” said Barnett Rubin, an expert on Afghanistan at New York University. “However, the Iranians believe the No. 1 threat is an American attack to overthrow their government. They may do anything it takes to make the United States and its allies uncomfortable there.”

Gordon presents an interesting contrast of views. Whether one argues that Iran takes offensive steps against the US and coalition allies, or defensive steps to preclude US “aggression,” one can hardly argue that Iran seeks a peaceful outcome in either Afghanistan or Iraq. They mean to have their way in the region, and the US remains the primary obstacle to Iranian dreams of supremacy.

We have played it very, very safe in dealing with Iranian interference in both Iraq and Afghanistan. GEN Pace strives mightily, as quoted by Gordon, to maintain some semblance of military focus while avoiding what would seem to the rest of us as clear provocations by Iran:

 “I think we should continue to be aggressive inside of Iraq, and aggressive inside of Afghanistan, in attacking any element that’s attacking U.S. and coalition forces, regardless of where they come from,” General Pace said. He also said that the United States and other nations should use diplomacy with the Iranian government “to address Iranian interference.”

The notion that someone in Iran, or working with Iran, attempts to supply the Taliban without Iranian Government knowledge and approval is risible. To suggest the same about their interference in Iraq is outrageous. From Gordon’s sources:

According to American intelligence officials, the support to militant groups in Iraq is so systematic that it could not be carried out without the knowledge of some senior Iranian officials. “Based on our understanding of the Iranian system and the history of I.R.G.C. operations, the intelligence community assesses that activity this extensive on the part of the Quds Force would not be conducted without approval from top leaders in Iran,” a senior intelligence official said this year. The Quds Force is an elite unit of the Revolutionary Guards.

Earlier I mentioned a piece from last year by Thomas Joscelyn, mentioned by McCarthy. It’s quite the read, though somewhat hard to follow.

This looks like as good an excerpt as any:

Importantly, the government's allegations and the detainee's corroborating testimony are at odds with the intelligence community's conventional wisdom regarding Iran's relationship with the Taliban. After years of mutual animosity, it was assumed prior to the war in Afghanistan that the Iranian regime would celebrate the fall of the Taliban. Each government had supported the other's opposition and diplomatic tensions flared repeatedly throughout the last several years of the Taliban's reign.

But the recently released transcript corroborates earlier reporting on Iran's cooperation with the Taliban, as well as al Qaeda. Afghani opposition sources reported in early 2002 that the Iranians helped Taliban and al Qaeda members escape approaching U.S. forces through the Herat province.

(snip)

The importance of this allegation goes beyond understanding Iran's past behavior. Currently, some analysts assume that fear of U.S. retribution limits Iranian interference in Iraq and support for al Qaeda. But if Iran's leadership agreed to set aside its differences with the Taliban in order to stymie American operations against al Qaeda, then such assumptions are clearly no longer valid.

No longer valid, these assumptions, but retained by such luminaries as the authors of the Iraq Study Group. As I stated earlier, these kinds of analytic prejudices gravely degrade the quality of any analysis that follows.